Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
1-2015

The Strategic and Discursive Contributions of the Max Planck
Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and
Regional Agreements
Peter K. Yu
peter_yu@msn.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter K. Yu, The Strategic and Discursive Contributions of the Max Planck Principles for Intellectual
Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, 62 Drake L. Rev. Discourse 20 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/407

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

THE STRATEGIC AND DISCURSIVE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE MAX PLANCK
PRINCIPLES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS
Peter K. Yu*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction
.........................................
20
II. Strategic Contributions.
...........................
...... 23
III. Discursive Contributions
......................
.......... 28
IV. Conclusion...........................................31

I. INTRODUCTION

In June 2013, the internationally recognized Max Planck Institute for
Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Max Planck Institute) -now
the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition-released its
Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional
Agreements (Max Planck Principles).' Drafted by the Institute's directors
and research fellows in collaboration with a team of outside experts, this
document seeks to facilitate the development of "international rules and
procedures that can achieve a better, mutually advantageous and balanced
regulation of international [intellectual property]." 2
Copyright 0 2014 Peter K Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property
Law and Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School.
The Author served as one of the 10 outside experts involved in the development of the
Max Planck Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional
Agreements. He would like to thank Josef Drexl, Reto Hilty, and Henning Grosse
Ruse-Khan for their invitation to participate in this project, and Timothy Alberts for
excellent research and editorial assistance.
1.
MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & COMPETITION LAW,
PRINCIPLES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL AND REGIONAL
AGREEMENTS (2013), available at http://www.ip.mpg.de/files/pdf2/Principles for IP

provisions inBilateral and RegionalAgreements finall.pdf
PLANCK PRINCIPLES].

2.

Id. preface.
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The goal of this document is straightforward. International trade
negotiations have become increasingly complex,' and countries have
repeatedly used intellectual property standards as bargaining chips.4 Even
worse, many of the negotiated agreements were concluded through
nontransparent, undemocratic, and unaccountable processes.' These recent
negotiations have therefore created an urgency for international experts to
endorse a set of consensus principles to guide the future development of
bilateral and regional trade agreements (BRAs).
As with all documents drafted by a committee in collaboration with
outside experts sharing different backgrounds, experiences, opinions,
concerns, and ideological persuasions, the final text of the Max Planck
Principles is filled with broad and compromising language. The document
also does not provide any path-breaking solutions to problems it seeks to
address, even though it does incorporate solutions that other
commentators have previously explored. Instead, the Principles' strength
and success lie in the important descriptive and normative statements they
provide on how countries should negotiate intellectual property provisions
in BRAs.
Although the document does not explicitly mention plurilateral
agreements, it is likely to apply well to this type of agreement, which Simon
Lester and Bryan Mercurio have referred to as a form of "loose" regional
agreements.' Thus, the Max Planck Principles provide important guidance
on not only the recent free trade and economic partnership agreements,
such as those established by the European Union and the United States,
but also the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),' the Trans3.
For discussions of the complexities in international trade and intellectual
property negotiations, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Non-multilateral Approach to
International Intellectual Property Norm-setting, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Daniel J. Gervais ed., forthcoming
2014) [hereinafter Yu, International Intellectual Property Norm-setting]; Peter K. Yu,
InternationalEnclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia,
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Yu, Regime Complex].
4.
See Peter K. Yu, The InternationalEnclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827,

893-94 (2007).
5.

See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64

SMU L. REV. 975, 998-1015 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears] (discussing the
secretive process used to negotiate the Anti- Counterfeiting Trade Agreement).
Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Introduction to BILATERAL AND
6.
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 1, 2 (Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio
eds., 2009).
7.
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011,
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Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement,' the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement,' and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement.10
The Max Planck Principles are highly authoritative, thanks to the
initiative of the Institute, the tireless drafting efforts of its directors and
research fellows-most notably, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan (the project's
coordinator)-the participation of 10 outside experts, and the endorsement
of dozens of signatories." Representing many different countries, these
signatories come from diverse and wide-ranging backgrounds, including the
policy circle, academia, and civil society organizations.12
Notwithstanding the Principles' specific focus and the constraints of
the drafting process, the document makes important contributions at both
the strategic and discursive levels. This Essay discusses these two sets of
contributions and situates them in the context of the ongoing challenges
confronting the development of the international trading and intellectual
property systems." The Essay concludes by briefly highlighting two
important areas of interfaces that the Principles, by design, are unable to

address. 14
Although this Essay was written with the Max Planck Principles in
mind, much of the analysis will apply to other documents seeking to
delineate a set of coherent principles on intellectual property provisions in
BRAs. A case in point is the Global Congress Declaration on Fundamental
50 I.L.M. 243.
8.
See Trans-PacificPartnership (TPP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,

http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (providing information about the

TPP).
9.

See Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), OFF. U.S.

http://www.ustr.gov/ttip
(providing information about the TTIP).

TRADE

10.

REPRESENTATIVE,

(last visited Feb. 19, 2014)

See Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), N.Z.

& TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-EconomicRelations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/RCEP/ (last updated Oct. 14, 2013)
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF.

(providing information about the RCEP).
11.
See
COMPETITION,

List of Drafters, MAX PLANCK

INST.

FOR

INNOVATION

&

http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/news/fta-statement/list-of-drafters.cfm

(last updated Feb. 18, 2014); List of Supporters, MAX

PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION

& COMPETITION, http://www.ip.mpg.de/en/pub/news/fta-statement/list-of-supporters.
cfm (last updated Feb. 18, 2014).
12.
13.
14.

See List of Supporters, supra note 11.
See discussion infra Parts 11-111.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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Public Interest Principles for International Intellectual Property
Negotiations." Drafted and endorsed by researchers, scholars, and policy
specialists from more than 40 countries, this declaration built on the Max
Planck Principles and was recently adopted at the Third Global Congress
on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest in Cape Town, South
Africa, in December 2013.16 Like the earlier document, this new
declaration is badly needed in light of the increasing comprehensiveness,
complexity, and fragmentation of the international trading and intellectual
property systems.
II. STRATEGIC CONTRIBUTIONS

Although the Max Planck Principles were drafted in collaboration
with academic commentators, the document is more practical than
theoretical. The Principles provide direct guidance on how countries,
developing countries in particular, can enhance their bargaining position
while at the same time providing much-needed adjustments to the
international trading and intellectual property systems.1 Such guidance is
particularly welcome for developing countries, which often "lack ...
resources, expertise, leadership, negotiation sophistication, [and]
bargaining power.""
As a strategic document, the Max Planck Principles make four
important contributions. The first contribution is the assistance they
provide to promote coherence in an increasingly complex and fragmented
international trading system. As I have noted in an earlier article,
fragmentation occurs along geographic, sectoral, and disciplinary lines."
Although commentators have yet to achieve consensus on whether
fragmentation helps or hurts developing countries, most commentators
take the view that fragmentation tends to hurt these countries more than it
helps them.2 0 As a result, the development of clear and concise principles is

15.
See Global Congress Endorses Principles for International Intellectual
Property; Criticizes Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. &
INTELL. PROP. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.pijip.org/2013/12/16/global-congressendorses-principles-for-international-intellectual-property-criticizes-trans-pacificpartnership-tpp.
See id.
16.
17.
See MAX PLANCK PRINCIPLES, supra note 1,
11-30.
18.
Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action,
34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 386 (2008).
19.
See Yu, Regime Complex, supra note 3, at 21-32.
20.
See Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1, 11 (2011);

24
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needed to reduce complexity and fragmentation.
In the past few years, commentators have widely lamented the
incoherence of the international intellectual property regime-or, more
correctly, the "international intellectual property regime complex," 21 which
can be defined as "a non-hierarchical, decentralised conglomerate regime
that includes not only the traditional area of intellectual property laws and
policies, but also the overlapping areas in related international regimes or
fora." 22 For example, the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (Gowers
Review), which was commissioned by the U.K. government, underscored
the need to develop intellectual property rights in a coherent manner
within both the national and international regulatory systems. 23 Jagdish
Bhagwati, researchers from the Asian Development Bank, and other
commentators also alerted us to the problems created by the so-called
"spaghetti bowl" or the "noodle bowl." 24 As Viet Do and William Watson
vividly described, "[t]he reality of [regional trade agreements] is a certain
lumpiness, with the spaghetti tangled in or around four or five discernible
clumps-meatballs, perhaps." 25
The second contribution of the Max Planck Principles concerns the
guidance they provide to restore the balance within the international
trading and intellectual property systems. While the acute power
asymmetry between developed and developing countries has made such
restoration very difficult, if not impossible, the guidance the document
Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 978-79 (2011).
21.
Yu, Regime Complex, supra note 3, at 13. For discussions of this regime
complex, see id. at 13-21; Kal Raustiala, Commentary, Density and Conflict in
InternationalIntellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1025-29 (2007).
22.
Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined
Future, 1 WIPO J. 1, 4 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order].
23.
See ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
58-61 (2006).
24.
See Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Inftituation with Free Trade
Areas, in JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ANNE O. KRUEGER, THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2-3 (1995); Wang Jiangyu, Association of
Southeast Asian Nations-ChinaFree Trade Agreement, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES, supra note 6, at 192, 224; Richard Baldwin,
Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism, 53 SING. ECON.
REV. 449 (2008); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 20, at 978; Masahiro Kawai &
Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends and Challenges 13-14 (Asian Dev. Bank
Inst., Working Paper No. 144, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1480508.
25.
Viet D. Do & William Watson, Economic Analysis of Regional Trade
Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 10

(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006).
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provides helps level the playing field quite considerably. 26 The Principles
also provide the much-needed roadmap to help developing countries
strengthen their bargaining position while increasing their sophistication in
negotiating BRAs.27
One of the challenges concerning developing countries during the
negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 28 was their limited knowledge about
intellectual property and their equally limited ability to bargain with
developed countries. As Carolyn Deere Birkbeck, Peter Drahos, Susan
Sell, and many other commentators noted, developed countries and their
supportive industries successfully used their superior knowledge in the
intellectual property field to overwhelm negotiators from developing
countries. 29 If this unfortunate piece of history is not to be repeated, the
latter group needs to better understand the system while strengthening
their negotiating abilities. The Principles will come in handy to provide
strategic guidance in both directions.
The third contribution of the Max Planck Principles relates to the
emphasis they place on flexibilities and "ceilings." 3 0 These ceilings are
meant to be contrasted with "floors," which are common and ubiquitous in
agreements designed to set international minimum standards-be they
trade agreements, intellectual property agreements, or other types of
agreements. 31 The Principles explicitly recognize the need for countries to
26.
See, e.g., MAX PLANCK PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, 11 11, 13, 18, 20, 21, 22,
27, 28, 29, 30.
27.
See, e.g., id. 1 13, 16, 26.
28.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
29.
See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 8, 54-55 (2009); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC
LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 98 (2003); Peter

Drahos, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue, in
GLOBAL

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY

RIGHTS:

KNOWLEDGE,

ACCESS

AND

DEVELOPMENT 161, 169 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002).
30.
See MAX PLANCK PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, 4. See generally Annette
Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough Is Enough-The Notion of Binding
Ceilings in InternationalIntellectual Property Protection, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF TRIPS 359

(Annette Kur with Marianne Levin eds., 2011) (discussing the notion of ceilings in
intellectual property law and policy).
See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM.
31.
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adopt standards that are tailored to their social, economic, and
technological conditions.3 2 The document also highlights the concern that
the detailed and highly prescriptive standards many BRAs transplant from
developed to developing countries fail to take account of the latter's
specific needs, interests, conditions, and priorities. 3
Since the beginning of this millennium, developing countries have
successfully launched development agendas at the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), and in other fora governing public health, human rights,
biological diversity, food and agriculture, and information and
communications.3 4 Although these agendas have primary foci in different
issue areas, they work in tandem to preserve the sovereignty, autonomy,
and policy space countries fought hard to retain in the international
intellectual property regime.
The final contribution of the Max Planck Principles pertains to the
focus they generate on inclusiveness. The document outlines ways to
ensure that BRAs will be negotiated in processes that involve multiple
stakeholders and that provide meaningful and equal opportunities for these
various actors to influence the negotiations.35 More importantly, the
Principles help facilitate the development of treaties and trade mechanisms
that are democratically designed, achieve legitimacy, earn public trust, and
have staying power. In the long run, well- and fairly-negotiated outcomes 36
will bring more benefits to both developed and developing countries than
what we have today.
Even though the WTO and its developed country members have thus
far refused to admit it, one of the major challenges in the current Doha
Development Round of Trade Negotiations is that the international
trading body-and, by extension, its TRIPS Agreement-has lost its
legitimacy and the trust of a large number of WTO members, especially
those in the developing world.3 7 Although developing countries were
U. INT'L L. REV. 727, 756-57 (2011).
32.
See MAX PLANCK PRINCIPLES, supra note 1,

33.

6, 11, 18.

See id. 7.

See Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIo N.U. L.
34.
REV. 465, 511-40 (2009).
35.
See MAX PLANCK PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, 1 10-17.
Cf id. 1 18-22 (advancing principles to facilitate the development of
36.
well- and fairly-negotiated outcomes).
37.
See SELL, supra note 29, at 173; Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and
Principlesof the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REV. 979, 1024 (2009).
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promised concessions in textiles and agriculture in exchange for stronger
intellectual property protection and expanded market access, developed
countries have not fulfilled their part of the bargain. 8 A case in point is
developing countries' continued frustration with agricultural subsidiescotton subsidies, in particular. 9 Another example is developed countries'
continued failure to transfer technology to developing countries despite the
explicit obligations under Articles 66 and 67 of the TRIPS Agreement 40
and Paragraph 11.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision of 14 November
2001.41
Thus, if the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement are to regain legitimacy,
BRAs have to be negotiated in a way that is both fair and inclusive.
Adhering to the Principles will not guarantee that the negotiated
agreements will be fair to both sides, due in large part to developing
countries' drastically weaker bargaining power. Nevertheless, such
adherence would help create a fair and inclusive process, which in turn
could yield more buy-in from developing countries even if they could not
bargain with developed countries as equal partners.
Taken together, all four contributions have shown how the Max
Planck Principles can provide important strategic guidance on how
countries can develop intellectual property provisions in future BRAs. The
first three contributions discussed in this section-coherence, balance, and
flexibility-parallel the analytical framework used in the Gowers Review. 42
The last contribution-inclusiveness-was a major concern sparked by the
increasingly inappropriate negotiation of "country club" agreements
among developed and like-minded countries-a phenomenon that began
only a few years ago.43
38.
See Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS
Game?, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 311, 318-19 (2011); Peter K. Yu, TRIPs
and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 379-86 (2006).
39.
See Ravi Kanth Devarakonda, TRADE: "Cotton Dossier" Will Make or
Break WTO's Doha Round, INTER PRESS SERVICE (June 9, 2010), http://www.

ipsnews.net/2010/06/trade-cotton-dossier-will-make-or-break-wtorsquos-doha-round/.
40.
TRIPS Agreement arts. 66-67.
41.
World Trade Organization, Implementation-Related
Issues
and
Concerns: Decision of 14 November 2001,
11.2, WT/MIN(01)/17, 41 I.L.M. 757
(2002).
42.
See GOWERS, supra note 23, at 6-7.
43.
See Daniel Gervais, Country Clubs, Empiricism, Blogs and Innovation:
The Future of InternationalIntellectual Property Norm Making in the Wake of ACTA,
in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: WORLD TRADE FORUM 323, 324 (Mira

Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012); Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, in
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III. DISCURSIVE CONTRIBUTIONS
The second set of contributions made by the Max Planck Principles
concern the ongoing intellectual property debate. Endorsed by intellectual
property experts from around the world, 44 the document serves as an
authoritative statement not only on what policymakers and negotiators
should do, but also on what is wrong with our current intellectual property
system-domestic and international alike.
At the discursive level, the Principles make six important
contributions. First, the intellectual property system cannot be designed
with the belief that one size will always fit all. More importantly, if there is
only one size, that size cannot be extra-large. 45 As I have noted repeatedly,
the TRIPS Agreement is flawed not only because it is "one size fits all" but
also because it is "super size fits all." 4 6 Economists and development
experts have empirically shown that countries need to adopt intellectual
property standards that are tailored to their economic conditions, imitative
or innovative capacity, research and development productivities, and the
presence of the much-needed human capital. 47 It is therefore highly
important that the Principles call for the inclusion of prodevelopment
flexibilities and safeguards in BRAs. 48
Second, intellectual property should be developed in a transparent,
democratic process that provides accountability. The procedures that the
Max Planck Principles call for stand in stark contrast to the
nontransparent, undemocratic, and unaccountable processes that have
been used to negotiate ACTA, the TPP, the TTIP, and other BRAs. 49 The
contrasting processes explain why such negotiations have thus far been
highly controversial. The efforts to sign ACTA, for example, attracted
protests from the public in multiple European cities and resulted in an
unprecedented rejection by the European Parliament.s0
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 258 (Dana Beldiman ed.,

2014); Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 5, at 1074-83.
44.
See List of Drafters, supra note 11; List of Supporters, supra note 11.
45.
See James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual
Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., No. 9, at 1, 3-4.

46.

E.g., Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order,supra note 22, at 9.

47.
See Peter K. Yu, From Piratesto Partners:ProtectingIntellectual Property
in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 Am. U. L. REV. 131, 233 n.502 (2000).
48.
See, e.g., MAX PLANCK PRINCIPLES, supra note 1,
4, 5, 21.

49.

See id. I

50.

See MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: How CORPORATE

10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 28.
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Third, the development of intellectual property law and policy should
not be conducted as a faith- or rhetoric-based exercise. Instead, it should
be based on empirical support and verifiable data." Not only do the Max
Planck Principles call for evidence-based law- and policymaking, but they
also underscore the importance of undertaking impact studies.52 Those
studies are consistent with the WIPO Development Agenda, which
includes "assessment, evaluation, and impact studies" among one of its six
clusters of recommendations. 53 Impact assessments have also been widely
used in the fields of biological diversity, human rights, and public health. 54
Fourth, the negotiation of intellectual property provisions in BRAs
should not privilege intellectual property rights holders.5 Although rights
holders have played an admittedly important role in the intellectual
property system, the advent of new technologies-including the internet
and other new media-has led to the emergence of a rich and wide variety
of new or previously unengaged stakeholders." Thus, regardless of how
good the intentions of intellectual property rights holders may be, it would
be highly unwise to leave the development of the intellectual property
system to only a narrow group of self-interested players. 7
LOBBYING THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS 106-28 (2013).
51.
See WILLIAM PATRY, How To Fix COPYRIGHT

49-74 (2011); Yu, The
InternationalEnclosure Movement, supra note 4, at 897-99.
52.
See MAX PLANCK PRINCIPLES, supra note 1,
16, 22; see also Peter K.
Yu, Intellectual Propertyand Human Rights in the NonmultilateralEra, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1045, 1096-98 (2012) (discussing the need for human rights impact assessments); Yu,
The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 4, at 901 (discussing the need for

impact studies in the intellectual property area).
53.
The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development
Agenda, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., cluster D, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development

/en/agenda/recommendations.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
54.
See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity art. 14(1)(a), June 5, 1992,
1760 U.N.T.S. 143; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the
Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary
or Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of
the Covenant) 1 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,CESCR,,,441543594,0.html; Comm'n
on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation & Pub. Health, World Health Org., Public
Health: Innovation and IntellectualProperty Rights 10 (2006).
55.
See MAX PLANCK PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, 11 10, 14, 15, 17, 22.
See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 34, at 538.
56.

57.
The same argument could be made against a process that privileges civil
society organizations. As far as intellectual property is concerned, however, these
organizations have not yet achieved as privileged a position as that of intellectual
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Fifth, the negotiation of intellectual property provisions in BRAs
should not take on a heavy gloss of trade, investment, or security." In
recent years, many developed countries-in particular the United States
and members of the European Union-have used intellectual property
standards as bargaining chips to negotiate their BRAs." Distorted by the
focus on trade or investment as the bottom line, the negotiation of many of
these standards ends up ignoring incentives they seek to generate and the
balance that the intellectual property system traditionally strikes. 61
Finally, technical assistance should not be provided based on the
interests of donor countries or the privileged members of an international
intergovernmental organization-be it WIPO or the WTO. 61 While
developing countries remain in need of assistance from developed
countries, it is important that the former will be able to secure the type of
assistance they need. Although the drafters of the Max Planck Principles
were concerned about the plight of developing countries, they rightly
refrained from taking a paternalistic approach to prescribe what these
countries should do. Instead, the document underscores the need for these
countries to have technical assistance that takes account of developmental

needs.6 2
In sum, the Max Planck Principles provide important guidance on
issues highly important to the ongoing intellectual property debate. The six
contributions highlighted here not only provide a quick recapitulation of
the major problems confronting our intellectual property system, but also

property rights holders. Given the current developments, it is also unlikely that they
will be able to do so in the near future.
58.
See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Enforcement Measures and Their
Human Rights Threats, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FROM

(Christophe Geiger ed., forthcoming 2014) (noting the
problems raised by putting such a heavy trade gloss on intellectual property
CONCEPTS TO PRACTICE

provisions); Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti- Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 3 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law Program of

Info. Justice & Intellectual Prop., Research Paper Series No. 15, 2010) (noting the
growing use of security to frame demands for higher intellectual property standards),
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/15/.
59.

See, e.g., Yu, The InternationalEnclosure Movement, supra note 4, at 892-

94.
60.
See id. at 892-901 (discussing an emerging "incentive-investment divide"
between national and foreign intellectual property policies).
61.
See DEERE, supra note 29, at 200-01; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPSRound II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 25 (2004).
See MAX PLANCK PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, 27.
62.
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remind us about how far the intellectual property policy debate has
advanced. Although the issues discussed here have been around for more
than a decade now, they did not receive much attention until recently. It is
therefore important that developing-country governments and their
supporters do not lose sight of the momentum they have built. It is also
urgent that they take advantage of the Principles or similar documents to
reflect on those BRAs they have already signed and to advance the
position they are now taking in ongoing negotiations. 63
IV. CONCLUSION

While the Max Planck Principles have made important contributions
at both the strategic and discursive levels, they do not speak much about
issues concerning the interfaces with BRAs other than the crossdisciplinary interactions between intellectual property and other issue
areas. 64 The lack of such discussion was due in large part to the specific
design of the document. The challenge of including all the principles in a
four-page document is immense, and the drafters inevitably struggled with
the usual trade-offs between breadth and brevity. Nevertheless, the
omitted interface issues remain important in the context of intellectual
property provisions in BRAs.6s
External to the ever-expanding web of BRAs are issues concerning
the interface between these agreements and the multilateral trading
system. As shown by WIPO's recent successful negotiation of the Beijing
Treaty on Audiovisual Performances16 and the Marrakesh Treaty to
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled,' developed and like-minded
countries have not abandoned the multilateral forum, notwithstanding
63.
See id. 30.
64.
See id. 23.
65.
See Sonja Bartsch et al., Interfaces: A Concept for the Analysis of Global
Health Governance, in GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST

HIV/AIDS 18 (Wolfgang Hein et al. eds., 2007) (advancing the concept and logic of
"interfaces" for analyzing global governance); Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents,
Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1563, 1622 (2013) (discussing the
growing attention on the multifaceted interfaces between and among different
international regimes).
66.
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, adopted June 24, 2012,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file-id=295837.
67.

Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons

Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, adopted June 27,
2013, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file-id=301016.
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their negotiation of BRAs, ACTA, the TPP, the TTIP, and the RCEP. 68
Instead, BRAs and the multilateral system seem to be developing in a
parallel fashion at the same time.69 How the former interfaces with the
latter will remain highly significant in the near future.
Internally, it is equally important to remember that BRAs vary
considerably in goals, participants, format, coverage, language, and
emphases. Such variations largely depend on the countries initiating the
related agreements. While BRAs initiated by the United States tend to be
created out of a template,"' agreements negotiated by other countries
contain more variations. The free trade agreements negotiated by China,
for example, are filled with terms that are specifically tailored to the needs
and interests of its negotiating partners."1 Many of these agreements also
seek to achieve noneconomic goals, along with the usual economic or
trade-related targets.72 Taken together, all of these variations could
eventually precipitate tension, or even conflict, within the international
trading and intellectual property systems, leading to what I have described
as a "battle" of free trade agreements.71
There are still many important and intriguing issues concerning BRAs
that the Max Planck Principles have been unable to address. Interestingly,
many of these issues will bring us back to the need for having this
document in the first place. The development of BRAs has created many
new questions and unintended consequences. It is high time we use these
68.
69.

See Yu, InternationalIntellectualProperty Norm-setting, supra note 3.
See id.

70.
For discussions of the United States' template-based approach, see Peter
Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 791, 794 (2001); Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The
Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 1023, 1025 (2009);
Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularityof BilateralInvestment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 686 (1998).
71.
72.

See Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 20, at 1011-13.
See Paul G. Buchanan, Security Implications of the TPPA, in No

ORDINARY DEAL: UNMASKING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 82 (Jane Kelsey ed., 2010) (discussing the TPP's security implications);
Olivier Cattaneo, The Political Economy of PTAs, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 28, 42-50 (Simon Lester & Bryan

Mercurio eds., 2009) (discussing how political considerations can drive the negotiation
of BRAs); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 20, at 992-1002 (discussing the
noneconomic considerations that drive the negotiation of China's free trade
agreements).
73.
Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 20, at 1018; see also id. at 1018-27
(discussing this battle).
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principles to assuage the collateral damage bilateral, plurilateral, and
regional agreements have inflicted on the international trading and
intellectual property systems.

